Abstract. We study homomorphic hash functions into SL 2 (q), the 2 × 2 matrices with determinant 1 over the field with q elements. Modulo a well supported number theoretic hypothesis, which holds in particular for concrete homomorphisms proposed thus far, we provide a worst case to average case reduction for these hash functions: upto a logarithmic factor, a random homomorphism is as secure as any concrete homomorphism. For a family of homomorphisms containing several concrete proposals in the literature, we prove that collisions of length O(log q) can be found in running time O( √ q). For general homomorphisms we offer an algorithm that, heuristically and according to experiments, in running time O( √ q) finds collisions of length O(log q) for q even, and length O(log 2 q/ log log q) for arbitrary q. While exponetial time, our algorithms are faster in practice than all earlier generic algorithms, and produce much shorter collisions.
Introduction
Let {0, 1}
* be the monoid of all finite bitstrings with string concatenation as monoid multiplication and the empty string as identity element. Let SL 2 (q) be the group of 2 × 2 matrices of determinant 1 with entries in the finite field F q with q = p n elements. Over 20 years ago, Zémor [20] proposed a general hash function construction employing homomorphisms h : {0, 1} * → SL 2 (q), that is, functions h with the property that h(uv) = h(u)h(v) for all u, v ∈ {0, 1} * . For a pair of elements A = (A 0 , A 1 ) of SL 2 (q), denote by h A the unique homomorphism such that h A (0) = A 0 and h A (1) = A 1 . A bitstrings b 1 . . . b m ∈ {0, 1} * is hashed to the matrix
Variations of Zémor's original scheme were proposed in, e.g., [18, 19] . We refer to the survey of Petit and Quisquater [14] for an introduction to this family of hash functions and its features.
At present, feasible cryptanalyses on this construction apply only for very special instances of A and q. A very efficient cryptanalysis for the case where q is a power of 2 and A is a specific, natural pair of matrices was recently provided by Grassl et al. [9] ; see the survey [14] and the paper [6] for a discsussion of the known cryptanalytic results and their limitations.
We study Zémor's construction in its full generality. Based on a well supported conjecture concerning expander graphs, in Section 2 we prove that SL 2 (q) homomorphic hash functions based on a random homomorphism is as secure as any concrete homomorphism, upto a logarithmic factor in collision length. Such worst case to average case reductions, also called random self-reducibility, are very desirable in cryptographic primitives, see, e.g., Ajtai's seminal paper [2] and the numerous works that cite it. This puts Zémor's construction at the frontiers of provably secure hash functions and motivates a further study of this approach.
The running time of all algorithms studied in this paper is measured by the number of multiplications of elements of SL 2 (q). In Section 3 we provide an algorithm producing, modulo the same well-known conjecture, collisions of length O(log q) in time O( √ q), for arbitrary q and a class of homomorphisms including those in [17] (end of §6, i = 2), [20] , [18] , and [1] . In Section 4, for random (A 0 , A 1 ) and arbitrary q we provide a collision search algorithm, and show, heuristically, that it finds collisions of length O(log 2 q/ log log q) in running time O( √ q). In Section 5 we show that, for messages of all practical sizes, our algorithm is faster and produces much shorter collisions than the best known subexponential time algorithm due to Faugère et al. [7] . Moreover, it is shown that the heuristic methods of Petit [16] and Faugère et al. can be used, for q a power of 2, to reduce an arbitrary pair of generators (A 0 , A 1 ) into a form in which our algorithm of Section 3 applies. Consequently, we obtain collisions of linear length for arbitrary homomorphisms into SL 2 (2 n ). The theory employed in Sections 2 and 3 may be used to obtain, in a rigorous manner, estimations for the first phase of an earlier algorithm of Petit et al. [15] . We survey this algorithm in Appendix A. For an optimal choice of parameters we estimate its performance, which turns out to be not as good as our new algorithms. Furthermore, our algorithms are conceptually simpler: unlike Petit et al. we do not appeal to discrete logarithm solving or use of the LLL algorithm. We remark that Petit et al.'s algorithm produces bitstrings hashing to the identity matrix, of length linear in p. While the same can be done with our first algorithm of Section 3, apparently this cannot be achieved with our second, more general algorithm of Section 4.
Finally, in Appendix B we prove that palindromic collisions, as exploited by Grassl et al. [9] in their efficient attack for q even, do not exist for arbitrary q, based on the same natural generating sets.
We mention, here only, that the memory required by our algorithm can be made negligible, using distinguished points as in [15, §6] . All of our estimations are supported by extensive computer experiments. When we are interested in estimating the involved constants, we use lg, the logarithm in base 2, instead of log. The operator | | means: absolute value when applied to a real number, cardinality when applied to a set, determinant when applied to a matrix, and bitlength when applied to a bitstring.
Hash functions typically fall into one of two categories: a mathematical design with transparent security but slow performance, or an ad hoc design and fast, but obscure security. The study of Zémor-like hash functions is worthy of investigation as it may lead to the design of a fast hash function whose security is based on a natural mathematical problem. Moreover, properties built into these constructions, including bit-level hashing (as opposed to fixed size blocks) and homomorphism and parallelism properties, may find use in applications. Our results, including the cryptanalytic ones, suggest that random instances of the studied hash family may meet the mentioned goals. We hope that our new mathematical treatment and simpler collision-finding algorithms will encourage further research in this field.
Worst case to average case reduction
In earlier papers on SL 2 (q) hash functions (see [14] and references therein), much effort has been put on selecting the pair (A 0 , A 1 ) = (h(0), h(1)) carefully. One motivation was to have the hash function efficiently implementable. Another was to have it more "secure": that small differences in the hashed messages are detectable, and that the hash function is "mixing". Here, we show that hashing with a random homomorphism-that is, with a pair of random elements (A 0 , A 1 )-is not less secure than hashing with any prescribed, carefully chosen homomorphism. The price may be at most a logarithmic factor in the collision length.
In this paper, by graph we always mean a directed one. Let G be a group. For a generating subset S of G, the Cayley graph of (G, S) is the graph Γ with G as set of vertices, and an edge from g to ga for each g ∈ G, a ∈ S. This is a regular graph of degree |S|. A regular graph Γ = (V, E) is an ǫ-expander if, for each set of vertices U ⊆ V with |U| ≤ |V |/2, the set N(U)-of neighbors of elements of U-satisfies |N(U) \ U| ≥ ǫ|U|. (Necessarily, ǫ ≤ 1 in this case.) Surveys on expander graphs are available in [10, 8, 11] .
For a d-regular graph Γ with adjacency matrix A, let λ(Γ) = max {|λ| : λ is an eigenvalue of A, |λ| = d} .
Throughout this section, |G| should be thought of as tending to infinity, whereas |S| (and thus d) and ǫ should be considered constant. We will use the following known facts. 1 In Item (2) of the following theorem, the vectorÂ m p describes the distribution on V corresponding to choosing a vertex according to the distribution p, and then performing m steps of random walk on the graph, where in each step one moves to a uniformly chosen neighbor of the present vertex. (As there are loops on the vertices, one may remain at the same vertex after the step.) Theorem 2.1. Let Γ = (V, E) be a finite d-regular graph.
(1) If Γ has loops on each vertex and Γ is an ǫ-expander,
A. Let u be the uniform distribution on V , and let p be an arbitrary distribution on V . Then, for each event B:
Let G be a finite group, and let g = (g 0 , . . . , g k−1 ) be a k-tuple of generators of G. The homomorphic hash function h g : {0, . . . , k − 1} * → G is defined by
The first item of the following proposition was pointed out to us by E. Breuillard. The references given are to the surveys, where the primary references can be found. 2 We state and prove this observation in a slightly more general setting than the one provided by Breuillard, but the argument is identical to Breuillard's. Proposition 2.2. Let G be a finite group, and let S = {g 0 , . . . , g k−1 } be generators of G such that the Cayley graph of (G, S ±1 ) is an ǫ-expander. Then:
Let u be the uniform distribution on G. Let e be the neutral element of G, and set g = (g 0 , . . . , g k−1 , e). If v ∈ {0, . . . , k} m is chosen uniformly at random, then for each event B:
Proof. (1) Let δ = ǫ/(k + 1). Assume that there is U ⊆ G such that |U| ≤ |G|/2 and |US \ U| < δ|U|. Fix s ∈ S. In particular, |Us \ U| < δ|U|, and thus
Thus, |Us −1 \ U| < δ|U|, and therefore
. By (1), the Cayley graph of (G, S) is a δ-expander. The Cayley graph of (G, S ∪ {e}), where e is the neutral element of G, is the Cayley graph of (G, S), with a loop added at each vertex. As N(U) \ U does not change when adding loops, the Cayley graph of (G, S ∪ {e}) is a δ-expander, too.
As the Cayley graph Γ of (G, S ∪ {e}) has loops on all vertices, Theorem 2.1 applies. As δ ≤ 1/2,
Thus,
m be chosen uniformly at random. Then
is the endpoint of a uniform random walk of length m in the Cayley graph Γ of (G, S ∪ {e}), starting at e. By Theorem 2.1, for
we have that
and m is as required.
As its proof indicates, the following theorem can be generalized to arbitrary, not necessarily equal, numbers of given generators and random elements. We state it, though, in the form needed here. Proof. Let m = (c · 3 3 /ǫ 2 ) log |G|, with c large enough (say, 10). Let g = (g 0 , g 1 , e). Take uniformly random, independent v 0 , v 1 ∈ {0, 1, 2} m . By Proposition 2.2, r 0 := h g (v 0 ) and r 1 := h g (v 1 ) are statistically indistinguishable from independent, uniformly random elements of G. A collision
. As e is the neutral element of G, this is also a (typically, shorter) collision of length O(ml) in the original generators g 0 and g 1 .
Let ǫ > 0. Let P be a family of prime powers. For each q ∈ P, assume that A
is an ǫ-expander. Then, by Theorem 2.3, the associated hash functions h A (q) are not more secure than random hash functions h : {0, 1} * → SL 2 (q). In other words, the hash functions h R with R = (R 0 , R 1 ) ∈ SL 2 (q) 2 a uniformly random pair of matrices are the strongest in terms of collision resistance.
This observation is applicable in our setting for two reasons. The first is that, in all concrete proposals made thus far (e.g., [17, 18, 20] ) the corresponding Cayley graph was proved to be an expander. The second, more general, is the following well known and well supported conjecture (cf. Conjecture 2.9 in [11] ).
Conjecture 2.4 (Lubotzky). There is a constant ǫ > 0 such that, for all prime powers q, and all generators
In the case where the generators A 0 , A 1 are chosen at random and q is prime, this conjecture was proved to hold for randomly chosen matrices, with probability going to 1 as q increases, by Bourgain and Gamburd [3] . Breuillard, Green, Guralnick and Tao [5] have recently extended this result to q an arbitrary prime power. From another direction, Breuillard and Gamburd [4] proved that there is a set of primes q, of density 1 in the primes, for which the conjecture holds regardless of the choice of generators.
Collisions of linear length
The following theorem provides an algorithm for finding collisions of length O(log q) in time O( √ q), for a special class of generators. This class includes a substantial portion of the concrete pairs of generators proposed in the literature, including the ones in [17] (end of §6, i = 2), [20] , [18] , and [1] . According to Lubotzky's above-mentioned Conjecture 2.4 and the discussion following it, ǫ may be viewed as a constant in the following theorem.
The remainder of this section details the proof of Theorem 3.1. Let
be the subgroup of SL 2 (q) consisting of all upper triangular matrices.
Lemma 3.2. For generators
, the following conditions are equivalent:
(2) There exists P ∈ SL 2 (q) and ξ 0 , ξ 1 ∈ F q such that
Proof. (1) ⇒ (2): Let v be a nontrivial vector with
Assume that u = αv for some α ∈ F q . Let P ∈ SL 2 (q) be a matrix whose first column is v. Then
for i = 0, 1, and thus A 0 , A 1 do not generate SL 2 (q); a contradiction. Thus, u is linearly independent of v. Let Q be the matrix whose columns are (−u, v) and let P = |Q| −1 Q. Then
and having determinant 1, we arrive at (2).
(2) ⇒ (1):
By Lemma 3.2, we may assume that 
Proof. By induction on |v|. If |v| = 1 then h A (v) is A 0 or A 1 , both of the desired form. Assume the result holds for v. Then for each i ∈ {0, 1}, we have by the induction hypothesis that
has the desired form.
K is a subgroup of T . Since K is abelian, hashing into K with two noncommuting bitstrings u, v (i.e., such that uv = vu) yields the collision
Proposition 3.5. Let A = (A 0 , A 1 ) be a pair of elements of SL 2 (q), with
and
Proof. Let v = b 1 b 2 . . . b m , and assume that
By Lemma 3.4,
Moreover, we have that
and similarly for Proof. By Proposition 3.5, we have that
Multiplying on the right by h A (u) −1 and on the left by h A (v), the assertion follows.
We can now describe our algorithm. Let A = (A 0 , A 1 ) be a pair of generators of SL 2 (q) such that |A 0 − A 1 | = 0. First conjugate A to matrices B = (B 0 , B 1 ) which have the form as in Lemma 3.2. As conjugation is a group isomorphism, the Cayley graph is unchanged, which thus remains an ǫ-expander. Note that the order of SL 2 (q) is (q − 1)q(q + 1) ≈ q 3 . By Proposition 2.2, we can generate bitstrings v of length O(log q/ǫ 2 ) such that the statistical distance between h A (v) and a uniformly random element of SL 2 (q) is smaller than 1/q 2 . Next, hash with h B into the subgroup T using a meet-in-the-middle approach as done by Petit et al. [15] . We describe this approach using different, but equivalent terminology. In order to effectively hash into T , we need an efficient encoding of the cosets of T in SL 2 (q). In general, there is a bijective correspondence between transitive permutation groups and cosets of subgroups. The following proposition provides a concrete, efficient representation of these cosets as projective points.
Definition 3.7. Extend the definition of the quotient αβ −1 to the case β = 0 by declaring
Proposition 3.8. The map
is well defined and bijective.
Proof. Assume that
, and the claim follows by considering the possible cases: if any of γ 1 , γ 2 is 0, say, γ 1 = 0, then α 1 = 0 (since the matrices are invertible), and thus γ 2 = 0, and the code of both cosets is ∞. If none of γ 1 , γ 2 is 0, then the codes are
2 . This proves that the map is well defined. It is clear that the map is onto. As | SL 2 (q)/T | = q + 1 = |F q ∪ {∞}|, the map is bijective.
So, to hash into T , produce matrices C by lazy random walks on the Cayley graph of (SL 2 (q), {g 0 , g 1 }), starting at e, together with bitstrings v ∈ {0, 1} * of length O(log q) such that C = h B (v), and store v and the code of the coset h B (v)T , as given by Proposition 3.8. That is, if C = h B (v) then in terms of the entries of C the code of CT is given by c 11 c 
that we can terminate with
h B (vu) ∈ T . By Proposition 2.2, for each pair u, v of our bitstrings, the probability that the codes of h B (u)T and h B (v) −1 T are equal is, up to an additive O(1/q 2 ) error, the same as the probability that the codes of r 0 T and r 1 T are equal, for uniformly random elements r 0 , r 1 of SL 2 (q). As | SL 2 (q)/T | = q + 1, this probability is 1/(q + 1). The additive error of O(1/q 2 ) is negligible compared to that, thus O( √ q) bitstrings suffice for the above procedure to terminate.
Suppose we have found a bitstring b 1 . . . b 2m = uv whose hash value lies in T . By Corollary 3.6, the palindromic bitstring
; a collision of length 4m + 1, which is O(log q/ǫ 2 ). This completes the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Remark
Heuristic estimations and computer experiments. Throughout this paper, in our heuristic estimations we assume that for our purposes hashes of distinct bitstrings behave as if they are independent, uniformly distributed elements of the group in question. (Unless there is an obvious obstruction, cf. Section 4.2.1.)
For the algorithm presented above, one needs that, for two of our generated matrices, C 1 , C 2 , the codes of C 1 T and C −1 2 T are identical. This happens, heuristically, with probability 1/(q + 1) ≈ 1/q. Thus, we need to generate about √ q matrices. To this end, it suffices to hash all bitstrings of length up to lg √ q ≈ lg q/2. Having achieved that, the length of the bitstring hashing to T is twice that, lg q, and the length of the final collision is roughly 2 lg q. Our experimental results suggest that this heuristic is quite precisely correct. We have tested our algorithms for a variety of pairs p, n such that q = p n ≈ 2 16 , 2 32 . For each N = 16, 32, we first chose a random p in a prescribed interval {2 k , 2 k +1, 2 k +2, . . . , 2 k+1 } indicated in the tables below, and then took n to be the rounded value of N/ lg p, so that p n ≈ 2 N . For each choice of N and an interval for p, we conducted 10,000 experiments where, in each experiment, we took a random ξ 0 , ξ 1 ∈ F q , and applied our algorithm to the pair
The output of these sets of 10,000 experiments is the minimum, median, average (and standard deviation), and maximum values encountered for each of the measured quantities (work and length). For N = 16, we have also computed, for the same instances, the work needed to find the shortest collision (by breadth-first search enumeration) and its length. The results of our experiments are displayed in Tables 1 and 2 . The striking observation is that, for all of these sets of parameters, and for the total 80,000 experiments conducted, none deviated substantially from our optimistic heuristic estimations. Moreover, it is clearly visible that our algorithm is not sensitive to the field characteristic p.
A generic short collision search algorithm
We now present a generic collision finding algorithm for SL 2 (q) homomorphic hash functions for arbitrary q and arbitrary pairs A = (A 0 , A 1 ). Heuristically, and according to experiments, our algorithm finds collisions of length roughly 2 lg 2 q/ lg lg q in running time O( √ q). This algorithm improves upon an algorithm of Petit et al. [15] for q a power of 2. Petit et al. demonstrate, heuristically, that their algorithm is expected to find collisions of length about 12lg 2 q in running time O( √ q log q). A straightforward generalization of their algorithm to an arbitrary field size q = p n yields collisions of length about 12plg 2 q, and a slight modification of their approach yields p times shorter collisions. We detail this approach and its mentioned refinement in Appendix A.
The basic idea of our approach is to hash with A = (A 0 , A 1 ) until we find two elements that commute. For suppose we find two distinct strings u, v whose hash values commute. Then a collision is given by h A (uv) = h A (vu). An obvious approach would be to hash into a commutative subgroup.
Roughly speaking, our algorithm is as follows. The first step is to hash twice on h A into the subgroup T . In fact, we show, heuristically, that we may assume that one of the matrices A 0 , A 1 is already in T , and it suffices to hash just once into T . This halves the amount of work, and makes it possible to reduce the length of the final collision by a factor of lg lg q. We then use the obtained matrices C 0 , C 1 ∈ T , to reduce the problem to hashing on h C to find two commuting elements. As we will see, aiming for the above-mentioned subgroup K (this was the approach taken by Petit et al. [15] ) is problematic for our approach, whereas the subgroup D of diagonal matrices is a good choice. In fact, we have a slightly better method, hashing directly to commuting elements, not necessarily diagonal ones. We describe our algorithm in two phases: the first phase describes how to reduce the problem into one where A 0 , A 1 are in T , and the second phase describes how to hash on T to find commuting elements.
4.1.
First phase: moving into T . In this phase we find two short bitstrings hashing into T . Finding the first string is easy. Since conjugation is a group automorphism, collisions are preserved under conjugation. The probability that a matrix in SL 2 (q) is diagonalizable is 1/2 − Θ(1/q) [12] . Thus heuristically, A 0 , A 1 or short combination thereof, call it A 2 , may be assumed to be diagonalizable. In other words, there is a bitstring u 0 of constant length such that A 2 := h A (u 0 ) is diagonalizable.
Let P ∈ SL 2 (q) be such that P −1 A 2 P is diagonal. In particular, P −1 A 2 P ∈ T . Conjugating A 0 , A 1 by P , let B 0 := P −1 A 0 P,
Setting B = (B 0 , B 1 ), we have that
It remains to find a second string whose hash value on h B lies in T , which we can do using the meet-in-the-middle method used in the proof of Theorem 3.1. Heuristically, we expect that among roughly √ q bitstrings there will be strings u, v with the same code (as given by Proposition 3.8), so that the string vu hashes into T and |vu| = |u| + |v| ≈ 2 lg √ q = lg q.
Setting u 1 := vu we arrive at two strings u 0 , u 1 of lengths l 0 constant and l 1 ≈ lg q, respectively, hashing to C 0 , C 1 ∈ T .
4.2.
Second phase: finding commuting elements in T . After finding strings u 0 , u 1 hashing to C 0 , C 1 ∈ T , the next and final step is to find two strings whose hash values commute on h C .
An obstruction.
It is tempting to repeat the same procedure for h C and the subgroup K of T of index q − 1. Unfortunately, we encounter the following obstruction, stemming from K being abelian. Let
, where ν 0 (·), ν 1 (·) denote, respectively, the number of 0-bits and the number of 1-bits in a bitstring.
On average, to have α
we need k 0 and k 1 to be roughly √ q, which would increase the length of the final collision by √ q, i.e. exponentially in lg q.
This problem is circumvented by Petit et al. [15] by hashing roughly lg q times into T , and then using an algorithm based on the LLL algorithm and computing discrete logarithms in F q (see Appendix A). However, this has a price, both in terms of running time and the length of resulting collisions.
We propose two simpler and more efficient approaches. for nonzero α ∈ F q . To construct a collision, we need to find two strings that hash on h C into D. We already have one such string, namely u 0 with hash value h B (u 0 ) := h C (0). We can employ a similar meet-in-the-middle approach as in the previous phase to find a bitstring w of length roughly lg q such that h C (w) ∈ D. Note that to avoid trivialities w must not be a sequence of concatenations of u 0 .
First solution: hashing into
Again, to employ a meet-in-the-middle approach we need an efficient encoding of the cosets of D in T , which is given by the following. 
and therefore α −1
, and the codes are equal. The map is onto. As |T /D| = q(q − 1)/(q − 1) = q = |F q |, the map is bijective.
Second solution:
hashing to commuting elements of T . This solution, which seeks for more balanced strings whose hashes commute, turns out slightly better than the previous approach of hashing into D. We need a code to test when two elements of T commute. 
Proof. By direct calculation, all entries of
are 0, except perhaps the upper right one
which is 0 if and only if
If β and δ are both nonzero then we can rewrite the above equation as
and the claim is proved. If β = 0 then, since α = ±1 we have that δ(α − α −1 ) = 0 implies δ = 0. It follows that the matrices are diagonal, and thus commute, and we have that (in the notation of Definition 3.7)
The case δ = 0 is identical.
Thus, to find two strings whose hashes on h C commute do the following. For roughly √ q bitstrings v (that are not a power of u 0 ) compute
and store v and the code (α − α −1 )β −1 . If we ever encounter the code 0 or ∞ then we are done, since this matrix commutes with C 0 . Assuming this rare event does not occur, find two strings u, v such that the codes of h C (u) and h C (v) are equal. We expect |uv|, |vu| ≈ 2|v| ≈ 2 lg √ q = lg q, and the overall length of the collision
is on average, in terms of the original hash function h A ,
The factor 1/2 comes from expecting a roughly equal number of zeros and ones.
Compressed collisions.
In the first phase, we arrived at two strings u 0 , u 1 of lengths l 0 constant and l 1 ≈ lg q, respectively, hashing to C 0 , C 1 ∈ T . For both the first and second solutions above, we can reduce the total collision length by exploiting the fact that u 0 is roughly lg q/l 0 times shorter than u 1 .
Then, in terms of h A , the length of a collision
Following is an algorithm for producing finite bitstrings v such that the length v l 0 ,l 1 is monotonically increasing, for l 0 < l 1 .
For n = 1, . . . , k 1 :
. . :
Proposition 4.4. Let l 0 < l 1 be natural numbers. In the notation of Algorithm 4.3:
Proof.
(1) Obvious. (2,3) By induction on n, observing that the bitstrings of length gn split into those terminating with 0 and those terminating with 1.
(4) Let m = ⌊n/2k 1 ⌋. The map
is injective. Its range is as claimed. Indeed,
Apply (2).
To find shorter collisions we use the same algorithms as before, but generate the bitstrings according to Algorithm 4.3. By item (4) of Proposition 4.4, we need that
and since l 0 is constant, we have
The length of the obtained collision is twice that.
Remark 4.5. The diagonalization trick in the first phase, that reduces the running time by a constant factor, leads to the lg lg q factor reduction of the resulting length. It may be that the constant estimation for the minimal length of a diagonal element is not provable, even using that the Cayley graph of (SL 2 (q), {A 0 , A 1 }) is an expander. The reason is that a random walk in an expander graph may miss a subset of half the size of the group for a logarithmic number of steps. If we aim, instead, at collisions of length O(log 2 q), then the first phase of our algorithm would be to hash twice into T , and the estimations for running time and bitstring lengths are provable as in the previous section. We do not know whether estimations in the second (noncompressed) phase are provable. If, for two random elements A 0 , A 1 of T , the Cayley graph of (T , {A ±1 0 , A ±1 1 }) is (with high probability) an expander, then they are. Tables 3 and 4 . Here too, our optimistic estimations are all validated. Indeed, our estimation 2 lg 2 q/ lg lg q turns out slightly more generous than needed. Faugère et al. [7] , building on [16] , devised a heuristic subexponential time algorithm in the case where q is a power of 2. Heuristically, for n 0 ≤ n, their time complexity and collision length are 2 ωn log n log n 0 n 0 log(n/n 0 ) and 32n
Computer experiments. Computer experiments are reported in
respectively, where ω ≈ 2.8 is the matrix multiplication constant. For the collisions to have polynomial length, n 0 must be O(log n). To minimize time complexity, n 0 should be Θ(log n). Let n 0 = c log n. Then the time complexity and collision length are, very roughly, 2 ω c · n log log n log n and 32 c · n 3+c log 3 log n .
To compare the performance of our algorithm to that of the subexponential algorithm from a practical point of view, we have limited the length of the collision to 2 80 bits (one terra terra bits), a generous upper bound for an acceptable message length. Then, for each n = 64, 128, 256, . . . , 16384, we have computed the maximal value of n 0 for which the collision length of the subexponential algorithm is not greater than 2 80 . For this value of n 0 , the running time of the subexponential algorithm is minimal. Table 5 lists, for each of these n, the running time and collision length (rounded) for our algorithm and the subexponential one. One sees clearly that, limiting the collision length to 2 80 , our generic algorithm is much faster in all cases, and produces much shorter collisions.
But this is not the end of the story. Petit has realized that, for q a power of 2, given the methods of [16] and [7] , our methods from Section 3 imply that, heuristically, collisions of linear length can be found for arbitrary generators A 0 , A 1 of SL 2 (2 n ). Modulo our results, this algorithm is implicit in the proof of Proposition 3 of [7] . Following is a detailed description of this algorithm.
A matrix E ∈ SL 2 (q) is orthogonal if EE t = I. The orthogonal matrices in SL 2 (2 n ) are precisely matrices of the form
where α ∈ F 2 n [16] . In particular, these matrices are symmetric and satisfy E 2 = I. Let A 0 , A 1 be generators of SL 2 (2 n ). Let
It suffices to find a collision for (B 0 , B 1 ). i.e., such that the second matrix is the transpose of the first. It suffices to find a collision for (C, C t ). This is the only case remaining to be dealt with.
By [16, Lemma 8] , we can find an orthogonal matrix E such that ECE = C t . Thus, CE = EC t , and
Consider the pair (CE, C). By the above-mentioned special form of orthogonal matrices, |E − I| = 0, and thus
Transforming a collision for (CE, C) to one for (C, C t ) is possible if the number of 0's is either even in both strings or odd in both strings. In this case, using that CE = EC t , C t E = EC, and E 2 = I, the E's can be pushed to the left, transposing the matrices C, C t on their way, and vanishing when meeting other E's. If an E remains (necessarily, on both sides), it can be canceled from both sides. Thus, heuristically, we need two collisions for (CE, C) to conclude. By the proof of Lemma 3.2, there are two cases to consider: CE and C are simultaneously conjugate to either upper triangular matrices or to matrices of the form
In the former case, by Section 4.2, we can find collisions of the prescribed form of length lg q in time √ q. In the latter, main case, by Corollary 3.6 it suffices to hash with h = h (CE,C) As the number of 0 bits in both strings of this collision is equal, this collision can be transformed into one for (C, C t ), and we are done. To illustrate this algorithm in the main case, assume that A 0 , A 1 are given. Then:
(1) Set B 0 := A 0 A 1 , B 1 := A 1 A 0 .
(2) Find a matrix P such that P −1 B 0 P = C, P −1 B 1 P = C t , for some matrix C. (3) Find an orthogonal matrix E such that CE = EC t . (4) Find a matrix Q such that
For example, assume that m = 3 and b 1 . . . b m = 011. Then
and in terms of CE and C, CECECCCCEC = CCECCCCECE.
Moving the E's to the left, using CE = EC t , C t E = EC, and E 2 = I, we have that
and thus
In terms of B 0 and B 1 , we have that
and in terms of A 0 and A 1 ,
The first reduction doubles the collision length. All other reductions preserve the collision length. Thus, we expect collision lengths of the algorithm to be roughly 2 · 2 lg q = 4 lg q.
Computer experiments.
The results for q = 2 16 , 2 32 are very similar to those in Tables 1 and 2 , with the only difference that, as expected, the collision length is doubled.
Results of experiments for q = 2 40 are provided in Table 6 . Here too, our heuristic estimations are confirmed, and even generous. The standard deviation of the collision length is very small, and is expected to converge to 0 as q increases. Computing N discrete logarithms in F q and using the LLL algorithm, find nonnegative integers k 1 , . . . , k N , with k The algorithms presented in Section 4 are faster, and provide shorter collisions. We stress that, unlike the Petit et al. algorithm, our generic algorithm does not provide bitstrings hashing to the identity matrix (see, however, Remark 3.10).
